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ABSTRACT
Crowd workers are distributed and decentralized. While de-
centralization is designed to utilize independent judgment to
promote high-quality results, it paradoxically undercuts be-
haviors and institutions that are critical to high-quality work.
Reputation is one central example: crowdsourcing systems
depend on reputation scores from decentralized workers and
requesters, but these scores are notoriously inflated and unin-
formative. In this paper, we draw inspiration from historical
worker guilds (e.g., in the silk trade) to design and implement
crowd guilds: centralized groups of crowd workers who col-
lectively certify each other’s quality through double-blind peer
assessment. A two-week field experiment compared crowd
guilds to a traditional decentralized crowd work model. Crowd
guilds produced reputation signals more strongly correlated
with ground-truth worker quality than signals available on
current crowd working platforms, and more accurate than in
the traditional model.
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INTRODUCTION
Crowdsourcing platforms such as Amazon Mechanical Turk
decentralize their workforce, designing for distributed, inde-
pendent work [16, 42]. Decentralization aims to encourage
accuracy through independent judgement [59]. However, by
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Figure 1. Crowd guilds provide reputation signals through double blind
peer-review. The reviews determine workers’ levels.
making communication and coordination more difficult, de-
centralization disempowers workers and forces worker collec-
tives off-platform [41, 64, 16]. The result is disenfranchise-
ment [22, 55] and an unfavorable workplace environment [41,
42]. Worse, while decentralization is motivated by a desire
for high-quality work, it paradoxically undercuts behaviors
and institutions that are critical to high-quality work. In many
traditional organizations, for example, centralized worker coor-
dination is a keystone to behaviors that improve work quality,
including skill development [2], knowledge management [35],
and performance ratings [58].
In this paper, we focus on reputation as an exemplar challenge
that arises from worker decentralization: effective reputation
signals are traditionally reliant on centralized mechanisms
such as performance reviews [58, 23]. Crowdsourcing plat-
forms rely heavily on their reputation systems, such as task
acceptance rates, to help requesters identify high-quality work-
ers [22, 43]. On Mechanical Turk, as on other on-demand
platforms such as Upwork and Uber, these reputation scores
are derived from decentralized feedback from independent
requesters. However, the resulting reputation scores are no-
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toriously inflated and noisy, making it difficult for requesters
to find high-quality workers and difficult for workers to be
compensated for their quality [43, 21].
To address this reputation challenge, and with an eye toward
other challenges that arise from decentralization, we draw in-
spiration from a historical labor strategy for coordinating a
decentralized workforce: guilds. Worker guilds arose in the
early Middle Ages, when workers in a trade such as silk were
distributed across a large region, as bounded sets of laborers
who shared an affiliation. These guilds played many roles,
including training apprentices [18, 44], setting prices [45],
and providing mechanisms for collective action [52, 49]. Es-
pecially relevant to the current challenge, guilds measured
and certified their own members’ quality [18]. While guilds
eventually lost influence due to exerting overly tight controls
on trade [45] and exogenous technical innovations in produc-
tion, their intellectual successors persist today as professional
organizations such as in engineering, acting and medicine [46,
33]. Malone first promoted a vision of online “e-lancer” guilds
twenty years ago [40], but to date no concrete instantiations
exist for a modern, online crowd work economy.
We present crowd guilds: crowd worker collectives that co-
ordinate to certify their own members and perform internal
feedback to train members (Figure 1). Our infrastructure for
crowd guilds enables workers to engage in continuous double-
blind peer assessment [30] of a random sample of members’
task submissions on the crowdsourcing platform, rating the
quality of the submission and providing critiques for further
improvement. These peer assessments are used to derive guild
levels (e.g., Level 1, Level 2) to serve as reputation (qualifi-
cation) signals on the crowdsourcing platform. As workers
gather positive assessments from more senior guild members,
they rise in levels within the guild. Guilds translate these levels
into higher wages by recommending pay rates for each level
when tasks are posted to the platform. While crowd guilds fo-
cus here on worker reputation, our experiment implementation
also explores how crowd guilds could address other challenges
such as collective action (e.g., collectively rejecting tasks that
pay too little), formal mentorship (e.g., repeated feedback and
training), and social support (e.g., on the forums). Because
existing platforms cannot be used to support these affordances,
we have implemented crowd guilds on the open-source Daemo
crowdsourcing platform [14].
As with historical guilds, several crowd guilds can operate
in parallel across different areas of expertise. To focus our
exploration, our prototype in this paper implements a single
platform-wide guild for microtask workers. While in theory
anybody can perform microtask work, prior work has demon-
strated that it requires a wide range of both visible and invisible
expertise to perform supposedly ‘simple’ work effectively [41].
This need for expert, high-quality microtask work has previ-
ously driven both platforms and requesters to curate private
groups of expert workers (e.g., Mechanical Turk Masters, re-
questers’ private qualification groups) [43]. In our case, this
expertise makes microtask work an appropriate candidate for
a guild.
We performed a two-week field experiment to evaluate whether
crowd guilds establish accurate worker reputation signals.
We recruited 300 workers from Amazon Mechanical Turk,
randomizing them between control and crowd guild condi-
tions. We then launched tasks daily to the workers in these
two groups, providing both conditions with a forum and
automatically-generated peer assessment tasks. In the crowd
guild condition, the peer assessment tasks determined guild
levels and workers received the assessment feedback. In the
control condition, no guild levels were available, and the peer
assessments were never returned to the worker being assessed.
We calculated each worker’s accuracy using gold-standard
tasks launched on the platform.
Guilds’ peer assessed ratings were a significantly better predic-
tor of workers’ actual accuracy than the workers’ acceptance
rates on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Furthermore, workers’
peer assessment was significantly more accurate and less in-
flated in the guilds condition, when peers’ reputations were
attached to the assessment. Workers in the guilds condition
also provided one another with more actionable feedback and
advice than those in the control condition.
In sum, this paper contributes a design and infrastructure for
crowd guilds as a re-centralizing force for crowdsourcing mar-
ketplaces. We target crowd guilds at addressing reputation
challenges, because reliable reputation is a difficult and rep-
resentative problem of the negative outcomes of worker de-
centralization. To follow, we review related work on crowd
collectives and historical guilds, then introduce our design and
describe our field experiment.
RELATED WORK
In this section, we first review literature on how crowdsourc-
ing marketplaces can improve work quality, focusing on peer
assessment methods. We then draw upon literature on the
historical formation of guilds and their legacy to the modern
world with a focus on structures for crowd workers to enhance
their work reputation and improve communication in the on-
line crowd work environment. Finally we discuss literature
on crowdsourced worker communities and their collective
behavior in online labor markets.
Improving work quality
Ensuring high-quality crowd work is crucial for the sustain-
ability of a microtask platform. Mechanisms such as voting
by peer workers [5], establishing agreement between work-
ers [57], and machine learning models trained on low-level
behaviors [54], have been used to gauge and enhance the
quality of crowd work. In addition to these techniques, task-
specific feedback help crowd workers augment their behavior
and improve their performance [10].
Crowdsourcing platforms have collected work feedback
through requesters, workers, using self-assessment rubrics,
and with the help of expert evaluators. The Shepherd sys-
tem [10] allows workers to exchange synchronous feedback
with requesters. Crowd guilds scale up this notion of dis-
tributed feedback [6] to make peer assessment and collective
reputation management a core feature of a crowdsourcing
platform.
Self-assessment is another route to help workers reflect, learn
skills and more clearly draw connections between learning
goals and evaluation criteria [4]. However, workers in self-
assessment systems become dependant on rubrics or use spe-
cial domain language, which tends to be difficult for novices
to understand [3]. Automated feedback [19] also enhances
workers’ performance. However, such systems are generally
used to enhance the capabilities of specialized platforms; for
example, Duolingo and LevelUp integrate interactive tutorials
to enhance the quality of work [9], which requires significant
customization for a given domain, and has not been demon-
strated in general work platforms.
Peer assessment driving quality
If crowd workers can effectively assess each other, they could
bootstrap their own work reputation signals [66, 30]. Worker
peer review can scale more readily than external assessment,
and leverages a community of practice built up amongst work-
ers with the same expertise [10]. It can also be comparably
accurate: peer assessment matches expert assessment in mas-
sive open online classes [30].
For effectively assessing each other’s contributions, it may be
prudent to recruit assessors based on prior task performance.
Algorithms can facilitate this by adaptively selecting particular
raters based on estimated quality, focusing high quality work
where it’s most needed [48]. The Argonaut system [19] and
MobileWorks [29] demonstrate reviews through hierarchies
of trusted workers. However, promotions between hierarchies
in the Argonaut system require human managers and Mobile-
Works needs managers to play an essential procedural role in
the quality assurance process by determining the final answer
for tasks that are reported by workers as difficult, which re-
stricts these systems’ ability to scale. In contrast, crowd guilds
provide automatic reputation levels based on peer assessment
results to algorithmically establish who is qualified to evaluate
which work.
The advice and feedback provided in peer assessment can facil-
itate distributed mentorship [6]. Self and peer assessment can
train reviewers to become better at the craft themselves [30,
1, 10], and feedback from those with more expertise improves
result quality [10, 39]. Returning peer assessment feedback
rapidly can increase iteration and aid learning toward mas-
tery [31]. In crowd guilds, we introduce a review framework
that draws on these insights, using workers’ assessments of
their peers’ work to offer quality based reputation categories
and constructive feedback.
Building on the above approaches, crowd guilds utilize the
observation that crowd members can evaluate each others’
work accuracy [10, 19]. Additionally, we demonstrate that
crowd guilds can create not just a rating for individual pieces
of work, but a stable and informational reputation system.
Guilds
Existing crowdsourcing markets deploy ad hoc methods for
improving and sustaining the community of workers. To de-
sign a holistic community, we take inspiration from guilds.
Historically, guilds represented groups of workers with shared
interests and goals, as well as enabling large-scale collective
behaviors such as reputation management.
Guilds originally evolved as associations of artisans or mer-
chants who controlled the practice of their craft in medieval
towns [49]. These craftspeople’s guilds, formed by expe-
rienced and confirmed experts in their respective fields of
handicraft, behaved as professional associations, trade unions,
cartels, and even secret societies [53]. They used internal
quality evaluation processes to progress members through a
system of titles, often starting with apprentices, who would go
through some schooling with the guild, to then become jour-
neymen [18], and eventually develop to master craftsmen [44].
Guilds prided themselves on their collective reputation, which
was an aggregate of their members’ progress through the qual-
ity system, and for high quality work, which enabled them to
demand premium prices. Some guilds even fined members
who deviated from the guild’s quality standards [45].
Today, the intellectual inheritance of guilds persists via pro-
fessional organizations, which replicate some of their bene-
fits [27]. Professions such as architecture, engineering, ge-
ology, and land surveying require varying lengths of appren-
ticeships before one can gain professional certification, which
holds great legal and reputational weight [46, 33]. However,
these professions fall into traditional work models and do
not cater for global and location-independent flexible employ-
ment [34]. Non-traditional work arrangements such as free-
lancing do not provide common work benefits such as eco-
nomic security, career development, training, mentoring and
social interaction with peers, which are legally essential for
classification as full-time work in many cases [25]. Although
the support of professional organizations exists for freelance
work, much of the underlying value of guilds does not.
Guilds re-emerged digitally in Massively Multiplayer Online
games (MMOs) and behave somewhat like their brick-and-
mortar equivalents [50]. Guilds help their players level their
characters, coordinate strategies, and develop a collectively
recognized reputation [11, 24]. This paper draws on the
strengths of guilds in assessing participants’ reputation, and
adapts them to the non-traditional employment model of crowd
work. Crowd guilds formalize the feedback and advancement
system so that it can operate at scale with a distributed mem-
bership.
Guilds offer an attractive model for crowd work because they
provide reputation information for distributed professionals
and carry a collective professional identity. They could also
be used to train their own members [60, 51, 26], and may
eventually give workers the opportunity to take collective
action in response to issues with requesters or the platform,
all of which are characteristics notably missing from today’s
crowdsourcing ecosystem.
Collective action
Despite being spread across the globe, crowd workers collab-
orate, share information, and engage in collective action [16,
64, 17]. The Turkopticon activist system, for instance, pro-
vides workers with a collective voice to publically rate re-
questers [22], though it remains a worker tool, external to the
Mechanical Turk platform. Along with Turkopticon, work-
ers frequent various forums to share information identify-
ing high-quality work and reliable requesters [41]. How-
ever, these forums are hosted outside the marketplace. This
de-centralization from the main platform makes it harder to
locate and obtain reputational information [23] and, when
needed, bring about large scale collective action. Therefore,
Dynamo identified strategies for small groups of workers to
incite change [55].
In existing marketplaces, workers are frustrated by capricious
requester behavior related to work acceptance and having
limited say in cultivating platform policies [8, 28]. Issues
related to unfair rejections, unclear tasks, and platform policies
have been publicly discussed [41], but workers have limited
opportunities to impact platform operations leaving less room
to accommodate emerging needs. Therefore, crowd guilds
focus on providing peer assessed reputation signals. To do
this, they internalize affordances of previous tools for peer-
review and gathering feedback, and give the guild power in
the marketplace to manage some of these issues.
CROWD GUILDS
In this section, we describe technical infrastructure for crowd
guilds in a paid crowdsourcing marketplace, enabling collec-
tive evaluation of members’ reputations via peer feedback.
A crowd guild is a group of crowd workers who coordinate
to manage their own reputation. As a research prototype, we
have implemented the guild structure with the Daemo open-
source crowdsourcing platform [14]. Crowd guilds could be
built to focus on specific types of tasks and cultivate expertise
for that labor. With a single platform-wide guild, however,
we focus on the visible and invisible aspects of microwork,
such as the expertise necessary to perform Mechanical Turk
tasks effectively [41]. We thus designed the crowd guilds
in active collaboration with workers on Amazon Mechanical
Turk forums. Our discussions with workers on forums and
over video chat led to several design decisions in crowd guilds
(e.g., payment for peer assessment tasks).
Crowd guilds introduce a peer assessment infrastructure al-
lowing workers to review each other’s work, provide feedback
via work critiques, and establish publicly-visible guild worker
levels (e.g., Level 2, Level 3). To complement crowd guilds
and explore the design space, we have also created prototype
implementations of other behaviors that guilds can support:
collective social spaces for informal engagement [65], group
determination of appropriate wage levels, and collective rejec-
tion of inappropriate work.
Reputation via peer assessment and guild leveling
Because each worker on a crowdsourcing platform is essen-
tially a freelancer, reputation information (e.g., acceptance
rates and five-star ratings) is generally uncoordinated and of-
ten highly inflated [28, 21]. Historically, in similar situations,
guilds stepped in to guarantee the quality of their own (simi-
larly independent) members, just as professional societies do
today. Thus, crowd guilds form around a community of prac-
tice [63] that can effectively assess its own members’ skills.
Crowd guilds manage their members’ reputation by assigning
Figure 2. Crowd guilds peer assess a random sample of their own mem-
bers’ work in order to determine promotion between levels. The assess-
ment form asks the double-blind reviewer to rate the work relative to
the worker’s current level, and give open-ended feedback.
public guild levels to each member. To do so, our infrastructure
randomly samples guild members’ work, anonymizes it, and
routes it to more senior members for evaluation to determine
each worker’s appropriate level.
Peer review
Our system automatically triggers double-blind peer reviews
of tasks completed by guild workers on the crowdsourcing
platform. Online peer assessment [30] is in regular use for
filtering out low-quality work in crowdsourcing [38, 37]—
crowd guilds adapt this process for use in promotion and
reputation. Peers and professionals are accurate at assessing
each other [12, 61], but people trust information more when
it comes from those with more experience and authority [47].
Thus, a worker’s peer reviews in a crowd guild can only be
completed by guild members ranked one level above: for
example, Level 2 workers can only be assessed by Level 3
workers.
To generate reviews, the crowd guilds infrastructure randomly
samples a percentage of each worker’s task submissions. Each
sampled submission is wrapped inside an evaluation task and
posted back onto the platform as a paid assessment task avail-
able to qualified members of the guild.
The reviews are double-blind—the workers do not know who
reviewed their work, or which of their tasks will be reviewed,
and the reviewers do not know which worker they are review-
ing. As a result, workers cannot strategically increase their
work effort to get more positive reviews, and reviewers have
little opportunity to be selective about their reviews to benefit
particular parties. Because reviews are conducted by guild
members one level above the worker being reviewed, the qual-
ity expectations of the reviewer are not too distant from those
of the worker, and when a guild member’s level increases, the
quality standards to proceed to the next level are proportion-
ately higher. Quality standards are not explicitly set for any
level, but are interpreted by those in the level as their reviews
decide who will join them.
Review tasks consist of a copy of the original task, the worker’s
response and three review questions (Figure 2):
Figure 3. Review and leveling combine to form reputation ranks. Reviews are funded through the platform and are conducted, double-blind, on random
tasks. The level of the worker is adjusted as the moving average of recent reviews meets thresholds. The moving average of recent reviews is used to
adjust the level of the worker if they meet a threshold.
1. A four-point ordinal scale for evaluating the quality of the
work. The scale points are calibrated to the worker’s current
level n, and ask the reviewer to rate the results as: a) Subpar:
appropriate for level n – 1, b) At par: appropriate for level n,
c) Above par: appropriate for level n+1, or d) Far above par:
appropriate for level n + 2. Workers collectively develop
criteria for each level as the guild matures. Over time, such
ratings will determine whether the worker stays, moves up
or moves down in the guild levels. The inclusion of a n + 2
assessment option was based on crowd worker feedback
that it should be possible to rapidly level up after a skilled
worker joins a guild.
2. A question asking if the worker thinks the requester is likely
to accept the work. Framing focusing on the requester’s
perspective (“If you were the requester...”) results in lower
variance responses compared with asking for egocentric
reviews (“Would you accept this?”) [15]. This question
is not expected to be used to adjust actual acceptance of
work, but gives useful insight into workers’ perceptions of
requesters’ interests.
3. An open-ended text field asking how the worker might
improve their work in the future. This field is designed
to enable critique, utilizing a “I Like, I Wish, What If”
model drawn from design thinking (e.g., [62]) because of
its efficacy in motivating high quality responses that are
actionable and prosocial.
To make it less likely that senior guild members exercise unfair
power, review tasks are also included in the tasks sampled for
review. Reviews themselves get reviewed—a form of meta-
reviewing. These meta-reviews are completed by all guild
members, not just higher-ranked members. If a guild member
is reviewing unfairly, others in the guild can recognize and
punish the behavior. Meta-reviews also ensure that the quality
standards for a level are reasonable.
Review tasks are paid tasks on the platform. Funds for review
could come from the requesters, workers or platform, and
could operate like a subscription, tax, or donation. Requesters
are familiar with paying platform fees such as on Amazon
Mechanical Turk, while platforms already invest in attracting
workers and requesters; each stand to benefit from crowd
guilds. However, the workers benefit most directly through
increased wages as a result from leveling. Donation models
can lack stability, and subscriptions can suffer from a lack
of granularity, while a tax on individual tasks avoids these
problems. In our design, we chose for crowd guilds to exact a
marginal cost per task from worker earnings. In practice, this
means that as workers complete tasks, funds will accumulate
to pay for a review of one of those tasks, selected at random.
Based on initial pilot analysis to establish the average time per
review for several different task types, charging 10% per task
and conducting a review after 10 tasks have been completed is
a default that serves both reviewers and workers well. Reviews
for many task types are significantly faster than the original
task. Because review tasks are fast, a 10% overhead is enough
for the more expensive higher-leveled workers to perform the
review. However, an algorithm could be designed to tune these
defaults dynamically, if task duration and review duration were
measured by the platform. For example, in the long term, 10%
may in fact be oversampling the reviews, as workers perform
hundreds of tasks per day.
In practice, this system must be adjusted to deal with cold-
start problems and privacy issues. If there are no workers
of higher reputation (e.g., if a guild has just started or if a
top-level worker is being reviewed), peers at the same level
can review the task. In addition, some requesters do not want
other workers seeing their tasks in order to protect private
information. For this reason, Daemo requesters can opt out of
their tasks being used for review purposes, which will avoid
tasks being seen by anyone other than the initial worker, but
this will also mean that additional information gained by the
review process will not be returned to them.
Levels
Levels (Figure 3) provide trusted reputation signals to re-
questers on the platform. All workers begin at Level 1.
Promotion is determined using the peer review feedback. The
four-point ordinal scale from peer review is converted into a
numeric scale 1–4, and a moving numeric average is calculated
across a window of 10 reviews. When a worker’s moving
Figure 4. Example of leveling thresholds. The average review on a 1-
4 scale, is used to choose one of 4 level shifts relative to the worker’s
current level: move down one level, remain in the same level, move up
one level, or move up two levels.
average reaches a threshold such as those shown in Figure 4,
their level will be updated. After every level change, the
moving average is reset. Unlike Mechanical Turk’s acceptance
rate, in which a blunder can mean a permanent mark on a
worker’s reputation, crowd guilds consider a moving average
so as not to hold workers back by their past mistakes. On
the other hand, a worker can also be leveled down if they
consistently produce low quality work. In this way, workers
have an incentive to continue doing good work.
The thresholds in Figure 4 only level down if work quality is
particularly low, rated 1 out of 4 for 90% of reviews. This set
of thresholds has been used for our current deployment and has
worked effectively as we are testing with a small number of
workers, but the thresholds should be tuned to deal with large
numbers of workers and large numbers of tasks to perform at
scale.
Other approaches to leveling we considered include a periodic
review schedule or a manual review board. A periodic review
cycle ties workers to a timeline that is not related to actual
changes in their quality and can move too slowly for active
and skilled workers. A manual board voting on promotions,
as in Wikipedia [36], would incur a larger cost overhead and
increase the risk of an oligarchic regime managing the guild.
Thus, we chose a continuous random sampling of work.
Exploring social effects
Historically, guilds did not restrict their attention to reputation
management; they also engaged in a broader set of collective
behaviors to support their trade and their members’ welfare.
While our attention in this paper is focused on reputation,
crowd guilds can also explore other collective behaviors. We
present several such prototypes: informal social engagement
through collective spaces, group determination of wage levels,
and collective rejection of inappropriate work.
Level-based pricing
If requesters can trust workers to be higher quality, then they
can rely less on redundancy and pay individual workers more.
When a requester posts a new task on Daemo and selects a
guild level to target, higher levels show higher wage recom-
mendations, based on the average hourly wage of workers at
that level. The average hourly wage is calculated in aggregate
over all members of a level, only counting work they perform
Figure 5. By the conclusion of the study, the crowd guild had evaluated
its workers and distributed them across four levels.
that was posted to that level. This offers a useful insight into
how much workers expect to make from a task—wage is of-
ten hard for requesters to make a judgement about without a
trial and error process [7]. Leaving this as a recommendation,
and not a requirement, allows for some flexibility and for the
pricing scheme to organically evolve.
Collective rejection
Because some requesters routinely disregard ethical wage stan-
dards, crowd guilds also provide workers with a task rejection
mechanism. Guild workers are able to collectively reject tasks
if they feel the price is unfairly low for the requested level.
When a worker rejects the task from their own feed, the task
is no longer available for that worker, and the requester is sent
a notice. However, when more than a small percentage of
workers from a level decide to reject a task, then the task is
removed from everybody’s task feed in the guild. With this de-
sign, requesters are incentivized to price their tasks favorably
enough to match the expectations of the worker community
and not underprice their tasks. In our current implementation,
3% of workers rejecting a task removes it from the platform.
3% was chosen arbitrarily and we hope to consider ways to
optimize this value in the future.
Open forum
Forums are widely used by the crowdsourcing community.
However, many of the most popular ones are external to the
platforms they serve, such as Turker Nation and the /r/mturk
subreddits [41]. The crowd guild forum is linked from within
Daemo platform: “Discuss” links are available within each
task to enable workers to quickly begin discussions focused
on specific issues. Workers’ reputation levels are publicized
with badges, and separate badges are provided identifying
requesters and administrators, affording direct communication
and helping to humanize the platform.
RESULTS
After two weeks in the study, workers in the crowd guild
condition spread themselves into Levels 1 to 4, with 151 of
workers at Level 1, 30 in Level 2, 13 in Level 3 and 2 in Level
4 (Figure 5). During this time, workers in the guild condition
completed a total of 15176 tasks, with an average of 87 tasks
per worker. Workers in the control condition completed a total
of 13427 tasks, with an average of 113 tasks per worker.
Coefficient Value Error t-value p-value
Approval rate 1.98 240 -0.59 0.55
Accepted tasks 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.83
Mean peer assessment 4.08 1.39 2.93 0.004
Feedback usefulness -0.34 0.75 -0.45 0.65
Forum activity 0.09 0.09 1.01 0.31
Condition 3.00 1.66 1.81 0.07
Table 1. A regression predicting workers’ ground truth accuracy un-
covered significant effects of average peer review score (1–4), verifying
that continuous peer review can be used to establish accurate reputation
credentials for workers.
Crowd guilds generate accurate reputation signals
We analyzed the relationship between workers’ ground-truth
accuracy and the reputation signals accessible to the system.
Table 1 contains the estimate, std. error, and p-values for
the associated variables (adj. R2 = 0.038). Mean peer as-
sessment rating was a significant predictor of ground truth
accuracy (β = 4.1, p < 0.005), supporting the hypothesis that
crowds can collectively author accurate reputational signals.
Traditional Mechanical Turk reputation signals were not sig-
nificantly correlated with ground truth accuracy, nor were the
self-reported guild feedback usefulness, nor the forum activity
level (all p > 0.05). Study condition (coded as 1 for guilds)
trended toward significance p = 0.07, suggesting that the work-
ers in the guilds condition may have produced higher-quality
results on average.
Was there a difference in the accuracy of peer feedback be-
tween conditions? The distribution of the overall peer assess-
ment ratings of each worker at the conclusion of the study
is shown in Figure 6. Testing correlations between workers’
ground truth accuracies and their average peer assessment rat-
ings, there was a significant correlation in the guilds condition
(p < 0.001, r = .36) and no significant correlation in the control
condition (p = 0.09, r = .18). This result suggests that feedback
in the guild condition was more informative, again support-
ing the hypothesis that the guilds condition produced more
accurate reputational information than the control condition.
To understand why crowd guilds produced more accurate rep-
utation scores, we address two questions. First, what differed
about the reputation scores between conditions? There is a sta-
tistically significant difference in the overall peer assessment
ratings between conditions (t(130.12) = 6.33, p < 0.001), with
reviews in the guild condition (μ = 2.5) significantly less in-
flated than those in the control condition (μ = 3.0). Reputation
inflation is a challenge in crowdsourcing marketplaces [21,
13], so a lower average score is preferable, which indicates
that reviewers in the guilds condition were more discerning
and spare with high ratings. Why does this difference occur?
We hypothesize that workers in each condition interpreted the
meaning of each rating scale level differently based on the per-
ceived impact of ratings. This rating deflation and discernment
was the likely mechanism behind the existence of a correlation
between peer assessment and accuracy in the guild condition
but not the control condition: in the control condition, score
inflation caused workers of different ground-truth accuracies
to have similar average feedback scores.
Figure 6. Workers’ peer assessment ratings in the guild condition were
less inflated than those in the control condition at the end of the study.
The second question: what about the crowd guilds design
was responsible for producing more accurate ratings than the
control condition? Potential hypotheses include the content
of the free-text feedback, engagement on the forums, or the
ratings themselves. The self-reported feedback usefulness
and forum activity variables in the regression provide some
insight into this mechanism. Neither feedback usefulness nor
forum activity were significant predictors of worker accuracy
(both p > .05). This result suggests that the community sig-
nificance of crowd guild ratings, the only other major feature
in this system, was the main influencer leading to improved
rating accuracy. In other words, current evidence suggests
that crowd guilds produce more accurate reputation signals
because workers treat the ratings differently when the ratings
determine other members’ levels. The guild’s social structures
and textual feedback may produce other benefits (e.g., a col-
lective identity, ideas for improvement), but they do not appear
to directly influence rating accuracy.
Cumulatively, these results support the hypothesis that crowd
guilds produce more accurate reputation information than no
guilds, and furthermore that they produce more accurate repu-
tation information than current signals on Mechanical Turk.
Assessing crowd guilds’ qualitative impacts
The results so far have investigated whether crowd guilds pro-
duce more accurate reputational information. However, our
study also included other prototype community and feedback
mechanisms, and it is important to understand the guilds’ ef-
fect on the community as well as on the reputation system. In
this section, we report a mixed-methods analysis of the feed-
back, forums, and survey results to understand the differences
in workers’ community behavior between conditions. We
observed that incentives pragmatize workers’ advice-giving
behaviour, that community integration can have strategic val-
ues for workers and requesters, and that at least some workers
argue that decentralization is a benefit of crowdsourcing and
should not be meddled with. Here we focus on qualitative
observations made during the study on each condition’s com-
munity forum and peer assessment feedback.
Crowd guilds pragmatize feedback
Workers in both the treatment and control communities were
mutually supportive. While conversations involving moder-
ators tended to relate to bug reports or bringing up specific
issues in a task, nearly all other threads were focused specifi-
cally on sharing know-how or awareness of platform features.
In the guilds condition, workers often focused on more prag-
matic feedback on strategies for instrumental and informa-
tional support, while control workers were more likely to offer
emotional support rather than information. For example, when
one worker in the control condition raised issues they were
facing, another control worker empathized and replied:
I’m sorry. hugs I hope your day gets better. Maybe there
is something the people running the study can do to fix
the problem.
On the other hand, guild workers responded to similar situ-
ations with pragmatic advice that focused on the challenge
being faced. When a worker expressed concern that review
tasks were not available to everyone, the response provided
direct informational support, for example:
I have been able to do review tasks since being upped to
level 2 /shrug
This difference was also seen in the peer review feedback
as part of task reviews. Reviews in the guild condition were
fewer characters on average (μ = 58.71, σ = 76.94 vs. μ = 68.66,
σ = 69.60 in control, Kruskal-Wallis p < 0.001) and generally
more focused and pragmatic. In the guild condition, responses
used to let a worker know that they had done part of a task
incorrectly were very direct:
Did not appropriately answer the question by specifying
how often they used each tool.
In the control condition, review responses exhibited doubt and
consideration about the worker’s thinking:
The page doesn’t say or give any clue other than peo-
ple growing marijuana as to whether they are pro-
legalization or not. Because of this, I personally would
have marked neither. But, then again, I could be wrong.
Marking neither is what I would have done to improve it.
This difference, when considered in connection to the im-
proved accuracy of reviews in the treatment condition men-
tioned above, suggests that crowd guilds improve the effective-
ness of peer review by professionalizing it. In contrast, we had
expected that guilds would result in a more supportive envi-
ronment in their peer review. When the community was filled
with workers who have control over each other’s reputation,
the community behaviors became more pragmatic.
Love it or hate it: workers’ preferences about centralization
Crowd guilds offer improved worker credentialing and feed-
back through re-centralization of reputation. In general, work-
ers on the forum appreciated and favored these goals. A few
workers in the guild condition, however, indicated a prefer-
ence for an entirely decentralized platform. These “lone wolf”
workers valued the independence of crowd work and being
masters of their own fate. Lone wolf workers would often
criticize guild features such as review and leveling, on the
basis that they would remove independence from the worker.
In our formative design feedback from crowd workers on Me-
chanical Turk forums, this sentiment also arose amongst a few
members of the community. However, the significant majority
of workers in the community expressed high levels of inter-
est in this platform becoming a reality. We thus hypothesize
that workers who have found success on Mechanical Turk as
it is today see increased interdependence as a threat to their
livelihood, stability and freedom.
The most salient complaints from workers in the guild condi-
tion were that they did not necessarily trust the reviewers and
the leveling systems to serve the interests of the community:
It seems to me that people are overly judgmental in order
to show that they deserve to be in Level 2 rather than in
worrying about whether the rest of us should be.
However, our quantitative analysis suggests that reviews on
the treatment condition outperform the control condition in
predicting actual quality of work.
Crowd guilds replace an algorithm (acceptance rate) with a
social process (peer assessment), and that social processes
can legitimately trigger disagreements and concerns between
community members. It replaces an “us vs. them” dynamic
(workers vs. requesters) with an “us vs. us” dynamic (Level 1
workers vs. Level 2 reviewers). These interdependencies
between workers can be good—they enable high-quality repu-
tation signals and community feedback, for instance—but they
can also cause strife and disagreements. However, if the guild
develops clear metrics, norms and accountability processes
over time, it can overcome many of these issues, and based on
our qualitative analysis, the benefit far outweighs the cost.
DISCUSSION
In this section, we reflect on the methodological limitations of
our experiment, the major design challenges in organizing a
crowd guild for a paid crowdsourcing platform, and the future
directions of guilds in the crowdsourcing design space.
Limitations
The experiment suggests that crowd guilds enable workers to
collectively manage their reputation metrics. Our evaluation
was able to populate a guild with 104 workers, but large-scale
crowdsourcing platforms have tens of thousands of active
workers. We are unable to observe how crowd guild dynamics
would play out at this scale, or over very long time periods,
although crowd workers have been shown to maintain consis-
tent performance over time [20]. These efforts remain future
work. It is possible that the most effective route will be to
allow workers to create their own guilds, and join as many as
they wish, to avoid massive guilds that are not differentiable.
External validity is also limited by Daemo’s existence as a
small-scale crowdsourcing platform today. We paid workers
to join the evaluation; we cannot know for certain that workers
would actually prefer a crowd guild like on Daemo to their
existing platforms. For crowd guilds to succeed, high-quality
workers and requesters must remain in the social system for
long periods of time and thus have a stake in making the social
system useful. An ideal evaluation would involve workers and
requesters who hold such a stake, either by changing Ama-
zon Mechanical Turk, or recruiting long-term workers and
requesters onto the Daemo platform. Since Daemo is not fully
evolved to conduct the entire functional experiment with real
requesters and does not already have a workforce, we recruited
users from Mechanical Turk. This decision made study less
realistic; however, because it minimized participants’ long
term motivations, it is also biased toward a conservative esti-
mate of the strength of the effect. There are possible novelty
effects which will need to be teased out in future work via
longitudinal studies and qualitative analysis. Finally, although
we tried to recruit a wide variety of real crowd workers with
real tasks from crowd marketplaces, our results might not yet
generalize to crowd work at large.
The ramifications of crowd guilds
Introducing a sociotechnical system such as crowd guilds
will inevitably shift the social and power dynamics of the
crowdsourcing ecosystem. Some of these shifts are already
visible. For example, the study made clear that guilds shifted
the forum away from just being a water cooler and toward a
work environment. In addition, the lone wolf workers were
less enthused about the prospect of their reputation riding on
other workers’ behaviors.
We might extrapolate from these visible shifts to ones that may
occur in the longer term. There will clearly be instances where
workers’ peer evaluations are inaccurate, and these unfair
ratings may sow distrust within the guild. Over time, the
guild levels may ossify and become oligarchical [56], further
making workers feel distrustful of each other. It remains to be
seen whether the meta-reviews, or the ability to split off and
form a separate guild, might keep these pressures in balance.
Finally, while we focused our prototype on guilds as a vehicle
for reputation, they could grow to encompass other functions
as well. We prototyped several of these functions—collective
rejection and wage setting, for example. We intend these pro-
totypes to stand as example guild functions based on the roles
that previous guilds played. However, crowd guilds may in-
troduce entirely new roles not seen in historical guilds. Could
they produce new forms of training? New social environ-
ments? Stronger relationships amongst crowd workers?
Future work
The future of crowd work depends on strong worker motiva-
tion, feedback, and pay [28]. There exist many other mecha-
nisms for achieving these goals, especially increasing a sense
of belonging instead of isolation. Crowd guilds begin with a
narrow goal and pragmatic design, aimed to provide mecha-
nisms for stronger reputation for workers and thus fairer pay
on the platform. A second step is to translate this centralization
into increased worker collective action in solving problems
such as asymmetric access to information, limitations on open
innovation and governance problems within the online labour
marketplace [55]. More broadly, we believe that effective
social computing designs can go further in enabling more
prosocial and equitable environments for crowd workers. One
worker mentioned:
I was just thinking that it would be very helpful/useful
to have some type of notification that signifies if a Fo-
rum Member is Currently Active/On or if they are Away
etc.. If we knew that specific Members were Online, we
would feel more connected and have a sense that we have
someone to turn to in real time.
Just as forum designs affect the trust in crowd worker fo-
rums [32], it is important to consider how guilds design will
influence governance. How will crowd guilds govern them-
selves long term? The guild in our experiment had no lead-
ership structure, but if it were to persist, it would need to
develop one. What policies can they control, how do they
make decisions, and how do they collect and redistribute their
own income? These questions combine social computing de-
sign and political science. In the future, we hope to analyze
variation in guild governance policies to better understand the
forms of self-governance that predict long-term engagement
and satisfaction.
Finally, in the current design, the guild represents all the work-
ers on the platform: where every worker is a part of the guild,
and they all collectively assess everyone’s work. However, re-
viewers may not have the domain knowledge in every subject
area to produce a quality review. We envision that different
guilds will form around particular communities of practice.
CONCLUSION
Crowd workers in microtask platforms have been decentralized
in order to reap efficiencies from independent work. However,
in the long term, it is crucial for workers to have opportunities
to connect with each other, learn from each other, and im-
pact the platforms they use. In order to address this, we have
drawn upon the historical example of guilds to bring workers
into a loose affiliation that can certify each other’s quality.
Thus, this paper introduces crowd guilds, a system that em-
powers worker communities with peer assessed reviews with
feedback leveling, and a connected community forum. Our
evaluation of crowd guilds demonstrated that crowd guilds
lead to improved reputation signals and community behaviour
shifts toward efficient feedback. More generally, crowd guilds
offer opportunities to co-design crowdsourcing platforms with
worker platforms.
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